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ABSTRACT
Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling is a dominant strategy, is a
standard concept in social choice theory.  However, the concept of strategy-proofness
has serious drawbacks.  First, announcing one's true preference may not be a unique
dominant strategy, and using the wrong dominant strategy may lead to the wrong
outcome.  Second, almost all strategy-proof mechanisms have a continuum of Nash
equilibria, and most of which produce the wrong outcome. Third, experimental
evidence shows that most of the strategy-proof mechanisms do not work well. We
argue that a possible solution to this dilemma is to require double implementation in
Nash equilibrium and in dominant strategies, which we call secure implementation.
We characterize environments where secure implementation is possible, and
compare it with dominant strategy implementation.  An interesting example of
secure implementation is a Groves mechanism when preferences are single-peaked.
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11. Introduction
Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling is a dominant strategy, is a
standard concept in social choice theory. Although it seems natural to assume that an
agent will tell the truth if it is a dominant strategy to do so, there are some
complications.  First, announcing one's true preference may not be a unique dominant
strategy, and using the wrong dominant strategy may lead to the wrong outcome.
Second, many strategy-proof mechanisms have a continuum of Nash equilibria, and
most of which produce the wrong outcome.  Third, experimental evidence shows that
most of the strategy-proof mechanisms do not work well, that is, very few subjects
reveal their true valuations. For example, see Attiyeh, Franciosi, and Isaac (2000) and
Kawagoe and Mori (2001) for pivotal mechanism experiments, and Kagel, Harstad, and
Levin (1987) and Kagel and Levin (1993) for second price auction experiments with
independent private values.
 The first problem can be solved by requiring “full” implementation in
dominant strategies. That is, all dominant strategy equilibria should yield a socially
optimal outcome. In order to cope with the second problem, we provide a new concept
called secure implementation. A social choice function is securely implementable if
there exists a game form or a mechanism that simultaneously implements the social
choice function in dominant strategy equilibria and in Nash equilibria.  Thus, all Nash
equilibria should yield a socially optimal outcome.  We characterize securely
implementable social choice functions: a social choice function is securely
implementable if and only if it satisfies strategy-proofness and a new property called
the rectangular property.  The question of whether secure mechanisms work well in
experiments is investigated in a companion paper (Cason, Saijo, Sjostrom&& && and Yamato
(2003)).
Most strategy-proof mechanisms do not satisfy the rectangular property.  For
example, the pivotal mechanism for public projects and the serial cost sharing
2mechanism for an excludable public good have a continuum of Nash equilibria.
However, all Groves mechanisms with single-peaked preferences do satisfy the
rectangular property.  Since secure implementation is a more demanding concept than
anything previously proposed in the literature, it is not surprising that the rectangular
property is rarely satisfied. We consider secure implementation to be a benchmark: if
secure mechanisms do not work well in experiments, then there is very little hope that
anything will work. But if a secure mechanism works well in experiments while
implementation using less demanding equilibrium concepts fail, then we may be able
to pinpoint the reason for the failure by comparing with the benchmark of secure
implementation.
The first person to study the relationship between dominant strategy
implementation and Nash implementation was Repullo (1985). His main result is that
if some social choice function f is dominant strategy implemented by some indirect
mechanism, but f is not dominant strategy implemented by its associated direct
mechanism, then the indirect mechanism does not Nash implement f. He concluded
that the concept of dominant strategy implementation should be discarded in favor of
Nash or Bayesian Nash implementation, and “the only role of dominant strategies
would be that of ensuring the existence of direct mechanisms that implement the social
choice rules under consideration in Nash or Bayesian Nash strategies” (Repullo (1985),
p. 229). We agree that the existence of “bad” Nash equilibria is problematic. However,
the experimental literature suggests that mechanisms designed for Nash (or Bayesian
Nash) implementation may not necessarily work well. In the absence of a dominant
strategy, a player’s best response depends on the other players’ choices, which may be
hard to predict. This strategic uncertainty may lead to the failure to coordinate on a
Nash (or Bayesian Nash) equilibrium. Thus, neither of the standard concepts –
dominant strategy implementation and Nash implementation – provides a robust
foundation for practical implementation. However, if a mechanism simultaneously
3implements a social choice function in dominant strategies and in Nash equilibria, then
we get the advantages of dominant strategies (strategic uncertainty is not important),
but we avoid the possibility that the players may play “bad” Nash equilibria.  In this
paper, we investigate the consequences of this strong requirement of secure
implementation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We give notation and
definitions in Section 2. In Section 3 we show that many well-known strategy-proof
mechanisms have continuum Nash equilibria. We characterize secure implementability
in Section 4.  Section 5 is for applications of our characterization result to public good
economies with quasi-linear preferences. In Section 6 we discuss the relationship
between dominant strategy implementation and secure implementation.  Concluding
remarks are in Section 7.
2.  Notation and Definitions
Let A be an arbitrary set of alternatives, and let I = {1, 2, ..., n} be the set of
agents, with generic element i.  We assume that n ≥ 2 .  Each agent i is characterized by
a preference relation defined over A.  We assume that agent i's preference relations
admit a numerical representation ui : A → ℜ.  For each i, let Ui  be the class of utility
functions admissible for agent i.  Let u = ( u1 , ..., un ) ∈ U ≡ × ∈i I Ui .   
A social choice function (SCF) is a function f : U → A that associates with every u
∈ U a unique alternative f (u) in A.
A mechanism (or game form) is a function g: S  → A that assigns to every s ∈ S a
unique element of A, where S = × ∈i I Si , Si  is the strategy space of agent i.  The list s ∈ S
will be written as ( si , s i− ), where s i−  = ( s1 , ..., si−1 , si+1 , ..., sn ) ∈ S i−  ≡ × ≠j i S j .
Given s ∈ S and ′si  ∈ Si , ( ′si , s i− ) is the list ( s1 , ..., si−1 , ′si , si+1 , ..., sn ) obtained by
replacing the i-th component of s by ′si .  Let g(Si , s i− ) be the attainable set of agent i at
s i− , i.e., the set of outcomes that agent i can induce when the other agents select s i− .
4For i ∈ I, ui  ∈ Ui , and a ∈ A, let L(a, ui ) ≡ {b ∈ A | u a u bi i( ) ( )≥ } be the weak
lower contour set for agent i with ui  at a.  Given a mechanism g: S → A, the strategy
profile s ∈ S is a Nash equilibrium of g at u ∈ U if for all i ∈ I, g(Si , s i− ) ⊆  L(g(s), ui ).
Let N ug ( )  be the set of Nash equilibria of g at u.  Also, let NA
g (u) be the set of Nash
equilibrium outcomes of g at u, i.e., NA
g (u) ≡ {a ∈ A | there exists s ∈ S such that s ∈
N ug ( )  and g(s) = a}.  The mechanism g implements the SCF f in Nash equilibria if for all u
∈ U, f (u) = NAg (u).  f is Nash implementable if there exists a mechanism which
implements f in Nash equilibria.
Let a mechanism g: S  → A be given.  The strategy s Si i∈  is a dominant strategy
for agent i ∈ I of g at u Ui i∈  if for all $s Si i− −∈ , g(Si , $s i− ) ⊆  L(g( si , $s i− ), ui ).  Let
DS ui
g
i( )  be the set of dominant strategies for i of g at ui .  The strategy profile s S∈  is a
dominant strategy equilibrium of g at u ∈ U if for all i ∈ I, s DS ui ig i∈ ( ) .  Let DS ug ( )  be the
set of dominant strategy equilibria of g at u.  Also, let DSA
g (u) be the set of dominant
strategy equilibrium outcomes of g at u, i.e., DSA
g (u) ≡ {a ∈ A | there exists s ∈ S such
that s ∈ DS ug ( )  and g(s) = a}.  The mechanism g implements the SCF f in dominant
strategy equilibria if for all u ∈ U, f (u) = DSAg (u).  f is dominant strategy implementable if
there exists a mechanism which implements f in dominant strategy equilibria.
The SCF f is strategy-proof if for all i I∈ , for all u u Ui i i,~ ∈ , for all ~u Ui i− −∈ ,
u f u u u f u ui i i i i i( ( ,
~ )) ( (~ ,~ ))− −≥ .  The following result is well-known:
Proposition 1 (The Revelation Principle for Dominant Strategy Implementation. Gibbard
(1973)).  If the SCF f is dominant strategy implementable, then f is strategy-proof.
The converse of Proposition 1 is not true: some strategy-proof  SCF’s cannot be
dominant strategy implemented (e.g., Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin (1979)).
53. The Trouble with Strategy-Proof Mechanisms
In this section, we consider several strategy-proof mechanisms which have been
extensively studied in the literature: the pivotal mechanism for a non-excludable public
good, the serial cost sharing mechanism for an excludable public good, the second
price auction for an indivisible good, the Condorcet winner voting scheme (a median
voter scheme) with single-peaked preferences, and the uniform allocation rule (a fixed-
price trading rule) with single-peaked preferences. We will show that each of these
strategy-proof mechanisms may have a continuum of Nash equilibria. Moreover, there
may exist “bad” Nash equilibria outcomes that are Pareto-inferior to the dominant
strategy equilibrium outcome. This might explain why many strategy-proof
mechanisms do not work well in experiments and they are not used in real economic
situations.
(1) The pivotal mechanism (Clarke (1971)).
Consider a two-agent economy with a binary non-excludable public good and
quasi-linear preferences. Two agents 1 and 2 are facing a decision whether they should
produce the public good or not. Agent i's true net value of the public good is vi  if it is
produced, and her true net value is 0 otherwise ( i = 1 2, ). In the pivotal mechanism,
each agent i reports his net value ~vi  and the outcome is determined as follows:
Rule 1: if ~ ~ ,v v1 2 0+ ≥  then the public good is produced, and if not, then it is not
produced; and
Rule 2: each agent i must pay the pivotal tax ti
t
v v v v v v
vi
j j
j
=
+ > > + =R
S|
T|
             if (i) or (ii) and
     otherwise
0 0 0 01 2 1 2~ (~ ~ ) ~ ~ ~
~
where j i≠ .
First, let ( , ) ( , )v v1 2 5 4= −  be the true net value vector. Figure 1-(a) shows that the
set of Nash equilibria is approximately a half of the two dimensional area.  Notice that
6the public good should be produced because the sum of the net values of the public
good is positive.  The upper-right part of the set of Nash equilibria is good since
constructing the public good is recommended.  However, the lower-left part of the set
of Nash equilibria is bad since producing the public good is not recommended.
Second, let ( , ) ( , )v v1 2 5 5=  be the true net value vector.  In this case, both agents
want to construct the public good.  However, Figure 1-(b) shows the area of bad Nash
equilibria is still large.
----------------------------------
Figure 1 is around here.
----------------------------------
We will generalize the above negative result with a binary public good and two
agents to the case with any arbitrary finite numbers of public projects and agents.
(2) The serial cost sharing mechanism (Moulin (1994))
Consider a two-agent economy with a binary excludable public good and
quasi-linear preferences.  The cost of producing the public good is fixed and it is c.  Let
(~ ,~ )v v1 2  be a reported gross value vector, and let ci  be the cost that agent i must pay
for.  Then the serial cost sharing mechanism is defined by the following four rules
assuming that ~ ~v v1 2 0≥ ≥ :
Rule 1:  if ~ ~v v c1 2+ < , then the public good is not built;
Rule 2:  if ~ ~ , ~ , ~ /v v c v c v c1 2 1 2 2+ ≥ < <  and , then it is not built;
Rule 3:  if ~ ~ , ~ , ~ /v v c v v c1 2 1 2 2+ ≥ ≥  , then both agents enjoy the public good, and
c c c1 2 2= = / ; and
Rule 4:  if ~ ~ , ~ , ~ /v v c v c v c1 2 1 2 2+ ≥ ≥ <  , then only agent 1 enjoys the public good, and
c c1 = .
7Let ( , ) ( , )v v1 2 5 4=   be the true gross value vector and c = 6  be the cost. Figure 2
shows that the set of Nash equilibria is quite large and the set of bad Nash equilibria
cannot be ignored.
----------------------------------
Figure 2 is around here.
----------------------------------
 (3) The second price auction (Vickrey (1961)).
Consider a two-agent model with an indivisible good.  Two agents 1 and 2 are
facing a decision who receives the indivisible good.  Agent i's true value of the good is
vi ≥ 0  if she receives it, and her true value is 0 otherwise ( i = 1 2, ).  Let (~ ,~ )v v1 2  be a
reported value vector.  The second price auction consists of two rules:
Rule 1: if ~ ~v vi j> , then agent i receives the good and pays ~v j  ( i j i j, , ;= ≠1 2 ); and
Rule 2: if ~ ~v v1 2= , then agent 1 receives the good and pays ~v2 .
Let ( , ) ( , )v v1 2 7 5=  be the true value vector.  Figure 3 shows that the set of Nash
equilibria is quite large.  Notice that agent 1 should receive the good because her value
is greater than agent 2's.  The lower-right part of the set of Nash equilibria is good since
agent 1 receives the good.  However, the upper-left part of the set of Nash equilibria is
bad since agent 2 receives the good.
----------------------------------
Figure 3 is around here.
----------------------------------
 (4) The Condorcet winner voting scheme (a median voter scheme) with single-peaked
preferences.
Consider a voting model with three agents and three alternatives, N = { , , }1 2 3
and A a a a= { , , }1 2 3 .  Each agent i‘s preferences are single-peaked and the most
preferred alternative (peak) according to her true preferences is ai :
8u a u a u a1 1 1 2 1 3( ) ( ) ( )> > , u a u a2 2 2 1( ) ( )> , u a u a2 2 2 3( ) ( )> , and u a u a u a3 3 3 2 3 1( ) ( ) ( )> > .
In the Condorcet winner voting scheme, each agent i reports her most preferred
alternative (peak) ~ { , , }a a a ai ∈ 1 2 3 , and the outcome is determined as follows:
Rule 1: if at least two agents report the same alternative, then it is chosen; and
Rule 2: otherwise, a2 is chosen.
As Figure 4 illustrates, there exist five Nash equilibria other than the dominant
strategy equilibrium of the true peak reporting. Now suppose that utilities are
transferable and symmetric: u a u a u a1 1 2 2 3 3( ) ( ) ( )= = , u a u a u a u a1 2 2 1 2 3 3 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )= = = ,
and u a u a1 3 3 1( ) ( )= . Then only the outcome a2  is efficient because the sum of utilities
is maximized.  The three Nash equilibria are good in the sense that the efficient
outcome a2  is chosen.  However, there are the two “bad” Nash equilibria in which the
other inefficient outcomes are chosen.
----------------------------------
Figure 4 is around here.
----------------------------------
A similar problem arises when the set of alternatives is an interval (Moulin
(1980)).1  In fact, it is easy to check that the set of the Nash equilibrium outcomes is
equal to the whole set of alternatives,2 and all Nash equilibrium outcomes other than
one dominant strategy equilibrium outcome (the median peak) are bad with
transferable and symmetric utilities.
                                                     
1 Strategy-proof voting schemes have been studied with more general structures of the set of alternatives,
including an interval as a special case.  For example, see Border and Jordan (1983), Barberà, Massó, and
Serizawa (1998), and Schummer and Vohra (2001).
2 For any point a in the interval, there exists a Nash equilibrium whose outcome is a: each agent reports a.
9(5) The uniform rule with single-peaked preferences (a fixed price trading rule)
(Sprumont (1991)).3
There are two agents, 1 and 2, who must share one unit of some divisible good.
Each agent i ‘s preference relations are single-peaked.  Let the peak of the preference
relation ~ui  be p ui(~ ) [ , ]∈ 0 1 . In the uniform rule, each agent i reports ~ui  and the
allocation ( (~), (~))f u f u1 2  is determined as follows:
Rule 1: f u p u ui i(~) min{ (~ ), (~)}= λ  if p u p u(~ ) (~ )1 2 1+ ≥ , and
Rule 2: f u p u ui i(~) max{ (~ ), (~)}= µ  if p u p u(~ ) (~ )1 2 1+ ≤  ( , )i = 1 2 ,
where λ(~)u  solves the equation min{ (~ ), (~)} min{ (~ ), (~)}p u u p u u1 2 1λ λ+ =  and µ(~)u  solves
the equation max{ (~ ), (~)} max{ (~ ), (~)}p u u p u u1 2 1µ µ+ = .
Let p p ui i= ( )  be the peak of the true preference relation ui . Suppose that
p p2 10 5< <. . Figure 5 (a)-(c) illustrate the set of Nash equilibria of this rule in terms of
peaks of reported preferences, ~ (~ )p p ui i= . Suppose p p1 2 1+ =  (see Figure 5-(a)).  Then
the Nash equilibria in the lower-right part are good, since the efficient allocation
( , )p p1 2  is assigned.  However, there are many bad Nash equilibria in the upper-left
part in which inefficient allocations are assigned.4 Similar things hold for the case with
p p1 2 1+ <  (Figure 5-(b)) as well as for the case with p p1 2 1+ >  (Figure 5-(c)). On the
other hand, if (a) p1 0 5> .  and p2 0 5> . , or (b) p1 0 5< .  and p2 0 5< . , then there exist
Nash equilibria other than the truth-telling dominant strategy equilibrium, but all
Nash equilibria are good (see Figures 5-(a) and (b)).
-------------------------------------------
Figure 5 and 6 are around here.
-------------------------------------------
                                                     
3 The uniform rule can be regarded as fixed price trading due to Barberà and Jackson (1995) with two
agents, two private goods, and a fixed price ratio.
4 For example, the equilibrium allocations are (~ ,~ )p p1 2  if 0 5 1 1. ~≤ <p p and p p2 2 0 5< ≤~ . ; and ( . , . )0 5 0 5 if
either (i) ~ .p1 0 5= and 0 5 12. ~≤ ≤p or (ii) 0 0 51≤ ≤~ .p and ~ .p2 0 5= .  These are Pareto inferior to ( , )p p1 2 .
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4.  Secure Implementation: A Characterization and a Revelation Principle
In the previous section, we saw that many strategy-proof mechanisms may
have “bad” Nash equilibria.  In order to overcome this difficulty, we introduce the
following new concept of implementation.
Definition 1. The mechanism g securely implements the SCF f if for all u ∈ U, f (u) =
DSA
g (u) = NA
g (u).5  The SCF f is securely implementable if there exists a mechanism
which securely implements f.
Secure implementation requires that for every possible preference profile, the f-
optimal outcome equals the set of dominant strategy equilibrium outcomes as well as
with the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes.
Next we characterize the class of securely implementable SCF's.  We use two
conditions. The first condition is strategy-proofness. As Proposition 1 indicates,
strategy-proofness is necessary for dominant strategy implementation, and so it is also
necessary for secure implementation. However, an additional condition is also
necessary for secure implementation. To see why intuitively, suppose that the direct
revelation mechanism g = f securely implements the SCF f.  See Figure 7 in which n = 2
and ( , )u u1 2  is the true preference profile.
Suppose that
(4.1) u f u u u f u u1 1 2 1 1 2( ( ,~ )) ( (~ ,~ ))= ,
that is, agent 1 is indifferent between reporting the true preference u1  and reporting
another preference ~u1  when agent 2’s report is ~u2 .  Since reporting u1  is a dominant
strategy by strategy-proofness, it follows from (1) that
                                                     
5 Secure implementation is identical with double implementation in dominant strategy equilibria and Nash
equilibria.  It was Maskin (1979) who first introduced the concept of double implementation. See also
Yamato (1993).  Note that secure implementation can be regarded as multiple (more than double)
implementation in dominant strategy equilibria, Nash equilibria, and all refinements of Nash equilibria
whose sets are larger than the set of dominant strategy equilibria.
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u f u u u f u u u f u u1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2( (~ ,~ )) ( ( ,~ )) ( ( ,~ ))= ≥ ′  for all ′ ∈u U1 1 , that is, reporting ~u1  is one
of agent 1’s best responses when agent 2 reports ~u2 .
Next suppose that
(4.2) u f u u u f u u2 1 2 2 1 2( (~ , )) ( (~ ,~ ))= .
By using an argument similar to the above, it is easy to see that
u f u u u f u u2 1 2 2 1 2( (~ ,~ )) ( (~ , ))≥ ′  for all ′ ∈u U2 1 , that is, reporting ~u2  is one of agent 2’s
best responses when agent 1 reports ~u1 .  Therefore, f u u(~ ,~ )1 2  is the Nash equilibrium
outcome.  Moreover, f u u( , )1 2  is the dominant strategy outcome, and by secure
implementability, the dominant strategy outcome coincides with the Nash equilibrium
outcome.  Accordingly we conclude that f u u( , )1 2 = f u u(~ ,~ )1 2  if (4.1) and (4.2) holds.
----------------------------------
Figure 7 is around here.
----------------------------------
A formal definition of this condition, called the rectangular property, is given as
follows:
Definition 3.  The SCF f satisfies the rectangular property if for all u u U,~∈ , if
u f u u u f u ui i i i i i( (
~ ,~ )) ( ( ,~ ))− −=  for all i I∈ , then f ( ~u ) = f (u).
A formal proof of the claim that the rectangular property is necessary for sure
implementation is given as follows:
Lemma 1.  If the SCF f is securely implementable, then f satisfies the rectangular property.
Proof of Lemma 1: Let g: S  → A be a mechanism which securely implements f.  Take any
u u U,~∈ .  Suppose that
(4.3) u f u u u f u ui i i i i i( (
~ ,~ )) ( ( ,~ ))− −=  for all i I∈ .
12
Choose a dominant strategy profile at ~u , s u(~)= ( s u s un n1 1(~ ),... , (~ ) )∈DS ug (~) .  By
dominant implementability,
(4.4) g( s u s un n1 1(~ ),... , (~ ) ) = f u(~) .
Let i I∈  be given.  Choose a dominant strategy for i at ui , s ui i( ) ∈DS uig i( ) .
Then  ( s u s ui i i i( ), (~ )− − )∈ −DS u ug i i( ,~ ) , where s u s ui i j j j i− − ≠=(~ ) ( (~ )) .  By dominant
implementability,
(4.5) g( s u s ui i i i( ), (~ )− − ) = f ( u ui i,~− ).
By (4.3), (4.4), and (4.5),
(4.6) ui (g( s u s ui i i i( ), (~ )− − )) = ui (g( s u s un n1 1(~ ),... , (~ ) )).
Further, since s ui i( ) ∈DS uig i( ) ,
(4.7) g(Si , s ui i− −(~ ) ) ⊆  L(g( s u s ui i i i( ), (~ )− − ), ui ).
By (4.6) and (4.7), g(Si , s ui i− −(~ ) ) ⊆  L(g( s u s ui i i i(~ ), (~ )− − ), ui ).  Since this holds for any
i I∈ ,  ( s u s un n1 1(~ ),... , (~ ) )∈N ug ( ) .  By Nash implementability and (4.4), f u( ) =
g( s u s un n1 1(~ ),... , (~ ) ) = f u(~) .  Q.E.D.
The mechanism g is called the direct revelation mechanism associated with the SCF f
if S Ui i=  for all i I∈  and g(u) = f (u) for all u U∈ . Strategy-proofness and the
rectangular property are not only necessary, but also sufficient for secure
implementability by the direct revelation mechanism.
Lemma 2.  If the SCF f satisfies strategy-proofness and the rectangular property, then the
direct revelation mechanism associated with f securely implements f.
Proof of Lemma 2:  First we prove that for all u U∈ , f(u)∈DS uAg ( ) .  Take any u U∈ .  Let
s ui i=  for each i I∈ .  By strategy-proofness, s∈DS ug ( )  and g s f u( ) ( )= .
Next we prove that for all u U∈ , N uAg ( )  = f (u).  Let u U∈  be given.  Take any   
s u N ug= ∈~ ( ) .  We show that g s f u( ) ( )= , i.e., f u f u(~) ( )= .  Since ~ ( )u N ug∈ ,
13
(4.8) ui (f (~ ,~ )u ui i− ) ≥ ui (f ( $ ,~ )u ui i− ) for all i I∈  and all $u Ui i∈ .
Further, since u DS ui i
g
i∈ ( )  by strategy-proofness,
(4.9)  ui (f ( ,~ )u ui i− ) ≥ ui (f ( $ ,~ )u ui i− ) for all i I∈  and all $u Ui i∈ .
By (4.8) and (4.9), ui (f (~ ,~ )u ui i− ) = ui (f ( ,~ )u ui i− ) for all i I∈ .  By the rectangular
property, f u f u(~) ( )= . Q.E.D.
By Proposition 1, Lemmata 1 and 2, we have the following characterization of
securely implementable SCF’s.
Theorem 1.  An SCF is securely implementable if and only if it satisfies strategy-proofness and
the rectangular property.
It is easy to check that the five strategy-proof mechanisms examined in Section
3, the pivotal mechanism, the serial cost sharing mechanism, the second price auction,
the Condorcet voting scheme, and the uniform rule fail to satisfy the rectangular
property, so that they have a continuum of Nash equilibria as illustrated in Figures 1-6.
In the early literature on implementation, it was pointed out that even if an SCF
f is implementable in dominant strategies, it may not be implemented by its associated
direct revelation mechanism: it may be necessary to use more complicated “indirect”
mechanisms (Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin (1979), Repullo (1985)). However,
Repullo (1985) showed that if the direct revelation mechanism associated with the SCF
f does not implement f in dominant strategies, then f is not Nash implementable by any
mechanism. Hence, it cannot be securely implemented. Conversely, suppose the SCF f
is securely implemented by some mechanism. Then by Proposition 1 and lemma 1, f
satisfies strategy-proofness and the rectangular property. Hence, by lemma 2, f is
securely implemented by its associated direct revelation mechanism. Thus, we have a
revelation principle for secure implementation:
14
Theorem 2. An SCF is securely implementable if and only if it is securely implemented by its
associated direct revelation mechanism.
The implication of this revelation principle is that we can limit our attention to
the set of direct mechanisms. Direct mechanisms are somewhat natural and easy to
explain to experimental subjects, which may add to their appeal.
5.  Applications to Public Good Economies with Quasi-Linear Preferences: the Class
of Groves-Clarke Mechanisms
In this section, we apply our characterization result, Theorem 1, to public good
economies with quasi-linear preferences.  We find that none of strategy-proof and
efficient SCF’s is securely implementable if public goods are discrete.  On the other
hand, strategy-proof and efficient SCF’s are securely implementable by Grove-Clarke
mechanisms with single-peaked preferences.
Let the set of alternatives be
A y t t y Y t in i= ∈ ∈ℜ ∀{( , ,... , ) , , }1 ,
where Y ⊆ℜ is a production possibility set, y Y∈  is an output level of a public good,
and ti  is a transfer of a private good to agent i.  For simplicity, we assume that there is
no cost involved in producing y.  Each agent has selfish and quasi-linear preferences:
u y t t u y t v y ti n i i i i( , ,... , ) ( , ) ( )1 = = + ,   i I∈ .
The class of valuation functions admissible for agent i is denoted by Vi .  Let V ≡
× ∈i I Vi .
Consider an SCF f satisfying the efficiency condition on the public good
provision:
 (5.1) y v v v v yf n
y Y
ii I( , ,... , ) arg max ( )1 2 ∈ ∈ ∈∑  for all v V∈ ,
where y vf ( )  denotes the level of the public good recommended by the SCF f  for the
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profile v.
The following result is well-known:
Proposition 2 (Clarke (1971), Groves (1973), Green and Laffont (1979)). An SCF f satisfying
(5.1) is dominant strategy implementable if and only if f satisfies
 (5.2)  t v v v v y v v v h v v v vi
f
n j
f
n i i i nj i( , ,... , ) ( ( , ,... , )) ( ,.. , , ... , )1 2 1 2 1 1 1= + − +≠∑  ∀ ∈v V ,∀i ,
where t vi
f ( ) represents the transfer to agent i recommended by the SCF f  for the utility profile v
and hi  is some arbitrary function which does not depend on vi .
A direct revelation mechanism satisfying (5.1) and (5.2) is called a Groves-Clarke
mechanism.  Proposition 2 says that we can focus on the class of Groves-Clarke
mechanisms for implementation of an efficient SCF in dominant strategy equilibria.
We now check whether or not secure implementation of an efficient SCF is
possible on two different environments.
1) Finite Public Projects
Suppose that Y is a finite set, called a set of public project choices, and 0∈Y ,
where 0 means that no public project is produced and y Y∈ such that y ≠ 0  means that
some public project is produced.  Let the class of valuation functions admissible for
agent i be V v Y v v y y Yi i i i= →ℜ = ∈ℜ ∀ ∈{ : ( ) , ( ) , }0 0  for i I∈ .
Lemma 3.  Let Y be a finite set of public project choices with 0∈Y , and
V v Y v v y y Yi i i i= →ℜ = ∈ℜ ∀ ∈{ : ( ) , ( ) , }0 0  for each i I∈ .  Then any SCF satisfying (5.1) and
(5.2) fails to satisfy the rectangular property.
Proof of Lemma 3: Take some b Y∈ with b ≠ 0 . Take a valuation profile v V∈ such that
 max ( ) ( )
{ }y Y
ii I ii Iv y v b∈ − ∈ ∈∑ ∑= <0 0  and max ( ) ( ){ }y Y jj i jj iv y v b∈ − ≠ ≠∑ ∑= <0 0  ∀ ∈i I .
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Given such a profile v V∈ , construct another profile ~v V∈  such that
 max ~ ( ) ~ ( ) ( ) /
{ }y Y
i i jj iv y v b v b n∈ − ≠= = ∑0  ∀ ∈i I .
Since max ( ) ( )
{ }y Y
ii I ii Iv y v∈ − ∈ ∈∑ ∑< =0 0 0 ,
(5.3) y vf ( ) = 0 and
t vi
f ( )  = v y v h vj
f
i ij i ( ( )) ( )+ −≠∑  = h vi i( )−  for all i I∈ .
Also notice that
max [~ ( ) ( )]
{ }y Y
i jj iv y v y∈ − ≠+∑0  ≤  max ~ ( ) max ( ){ } { }y Y i y Y jj iv y v y∈ − ∈ − ≠+ ∑0 0
                                                           = v b njj i ( ) /≠∑  + v bjj i ( )≠∑
                                                           < 0.
Hence,
(5.4) y v vf i i(~ , )− = 0 and
t v vi
f
i i(~ , )−  =  v y v vj f i ij i ( (~ , ))−≠∑  + h vi i( )−  = h vi i( )−  for all i I∈  .
By (5.3) and (5.4),
~ ( ( )) ( )v y v t vi
f
i
f+  = ~ ( (~ , ))v y v vi f i i−  + t v vif i i(~ , )−  for all i I∈ .
However, since max ~ ( ) ~ ( )
{ }y Y
ii I ii Iv y v b∈ − ∈ ∈∑ ∑=0 = ≠∑ v bjj i ( ) , y vf (~) = b ≠ y vf ( ) .  Q.E.D.
Theorem 1, Proposition 2, and Lemma 3 together imply the following
impossibility result:
Theorem 3.  Let Y be a finite set of public project choices with 0∈Y , and
V v Y v v y y Yi i i i= →ℜ = ∈ℜ ∀ ∈{ : ( ) , ( ) , }0 0  for each i I∈ .  If an efficient SCF satisfying (5.1)
is dominant strategy implementable, then it is not securely implementable.
In other words, for any mechanism implementing an efficient SCF in dominant
strategy equilibria, the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes is strictly larger than that of
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dominant strategy equilibrium outcomes if the number of public project choices is
finite.
2) Continuum Public Projects with Single-Peaked Preferences
Suppose that Y = ℜ and for all i I∈ ,
V v v y y r ri i i i i= ℜ→ℜ = − − ∈ℜ{ : ( ) ( ) , }2 ,
where ri  is agent i's most preferred level of the public good.  We can represent these
single-peaked preferences by the ri  instead of the vi .  The optimal output level of the
public good satisfying (5.1) is given by
y r r rf n( , ,... , )1 2 = 
1
n
rii I∈∑ .
We will prove that any SCF f meeting (5.1) and (5.2) satisfies the rectangular
property.  Take two profiles r r n,~∈ℜ .  Suppose that
~ ( ( ))v y ri
f  + t ri
f ( )  =  ~ ( (~, ))v y r ri
f
i i−  + t r ri
f
i i(~ , )−  for all i I∈ .
We can rewrite these equations as
( ~)A ri− 2  + ( )A rjj i −≠∑ 2  = ( ~)A B ri i+ − 2  + ( )A B ri jj i + −≠∑ 2  for all i I∈ ,
where A r nn= =∑ ll /1  and B r r ni i i= −(~ ) /  for all i I∈ .  By using the above equations, it
is not hard to see that r ri i= ~  for all i I∈ .  Therefore, y r y r rf f i i( ) (~, )= −  and
t r t r ri
f
i
f
i i( ) (~ , )= −  for all i I∈ .  Accordingly, the rectangular property is satisfied.
This result together with Theorem 1 and Proposition 2 imply the following
corollary.
Corollary 1. Suppose that Y = ℜ and for all i I∈ ,V v v y y r ri i i i i= ℜ→ℜ = − − ∈ℜ{ : ( ) ( ) , }2 .
Then any SCF satisfying (5.1) and (5.2) is securely implementable.
6. Dominant Strategy Implementation versus Secure Implementation
By applying the revelation principle for secure implementation, Theorem 2, we
can clarify the difference between dominant strategy implementability and secure
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implementability. The literature contains examples of social choice functions that are
dominant strategy implemented by some mechanism g, but not dominant strategy
implemented by the associated direct revelation mechanism (e.g., Repullo (1985)). By
Theorem 2, each of these examples in the literature gives an example of an SCF that can
be dominant strategy implemented, but cannot be securely implemented. This
illustrates the significant difference between the set of dominant strategy
implementable social choice functions and the set of securely implementable social
choice functions. In fact, Theorem 2 implies that the set of securely implementable
SCF’s is a subset of the set of SCF’s that are dominant strategy implementable by their
associated direct revelation mechanisms. This latter set is, of course, a strict subset of the
set of dominant strategy implementable SCF’s, which in turn is a strict subset of the set
of strategy proof SCF’s. To better understand the difference between the set of securely
implementable SCF’s and the set of SCF’s that are dominant strategy implementable by
their associated direct revelation mechanisms, we introduce the following definition.
Definition 4. The SCF f satisfies preference sensitivity if for all u u U, ′ ∈  and all i I∈ , if
f u u f u ui i i i( , ) ( , )− −≠ ′ , then there is some ′′−u i  such that u f u u u f u ui i i i i i( ( , )) ( ( , ))′′ > ′ ′′− − .
Preference sensitivity together with strategy-proofness are necessary and
sufficient for dominant strategy implementability by the direct revelation mechanism:
Theorem 4. An SCF is dominant strategy implemented by its associated direct revelation
mechanism if and only if it satisfies strategy-proofness and preference sensitivity.
Proof of Theorem 4. Suppose the SCF f satisfies strategy-proofness and preference
sensitivity. Consider the associated direct revelation mechanism. Suppose agent i’s true
preference is ui . By strategy proofness, it is dominant to announce the truth ui .
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Suppose announcing a different preference ′ui  is another dominant strategy. If
f u u f u ui i i i( , ) ( , )− −≠ ′  for some u i− , then by preference sensitivity there is ′′−u i  such that
u f u u u f u ui i i i i i( ( , )) ( ( , ))′′ > ′ ′′− − . Therefore, announcing ′ui  is in fact dominated by
announcing ui , which is a contradiction. Hence, f u u f u ui i i i( , ) ( , )− −= ′  for all u i−  after
all, so agent i’s lie (i.e. to say ′ui ) cannot ever affect the outcome. Hence, f is dominant
strategy implemented.
Suppose the SCF f is dominant strategy implemented by its associated direct
revelation mechanism. By Proposition 1, f  is strategy-proof. It remains to show f
satisfies preference sensitivity. Take any u u U, ′ ∈  and i I∈ . Suppose f u ui i( , )− ≠
f u ui i( , )′ − . Then announcing ′ui  is dominated by announcing ui  when agent i’s true
preference is ui , so that there is ′′−u i  such that u f u u u f u ui i i i i i( ( , )) ( ( , ))′′ > ′ ′′− − .        Q.E.D.
Corollary 2. If an SCF fails to satisfy preference sensitivity, then it is not securely
implementable by any mechanism.
Notice that preference sensitivity does not imply that each player will have a
unique dominant strategy in the revelation mechanism. Repullo (1985) gave an
example of a dominant strategy implementable SCF that is not implemented by its
associated revelation mechanism, and hence violates preference sensitivity by Theorem
4. It is easy to check that all five SCF’s discussed in Section 3 do satisfy preference
sensitivity. Since all five violate the rectangular property, the difference between the
two conditions is highly significant.
7. Concluding Remarks
Many researchers believe that if truth telling is a dominant strategy, then every
agent will adopt it.  However, we believe this issue should be decided by experiments.
In Cason, Saijo, Sjostrom&& && and Yamato (2003), we conducted experiments on two
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strategy-proof mechanisms: the pivotal mechanism with a binary public project that
has a continuum of Nash equilibria, and a Groves mechanism with single-peaked
preferences that has a unique Nash equilibrium.  We found a clear difference on the
choice of dominant strategies between the two: the frequency of dominant strategy
equilibria chosen by subjects was 50% in the pivotal mechanism experiment, while it
was 81% in the Groves mechanism experiment.6 We are currently conducting further
experiments.
                                                     
6 In both experiments, we used payoff tables only.  No details of the rules of mechanisms were given to
subjects.  In other words, we avoided possible complexity resulting from non-understanding of the rules
of mechanisms by subjects.
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